1) What is your government system?
Theocracy
Type: Islamic republic.
Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution--Ayatollah Ali Hosseini-Khamenei
President--Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad
First Vice President--Mohammad Reza Rahimi
Foreign Minister--Manouchehr Mottaki
Ambassador to the United Nations--Mohammad Khazaee
Constitution: Ratified in December 1979, revised 1989.
Branches: Executive--Supreme Leader (head of state), President (head of government), Council of Ministers, Assembly of Experts, Expediency Council, Council of Guardians. Legislative--290-member Majles (National Assembly, or Islamic Consultative Assembly). Judicial--Supreme Judiciary.
Political parties: Several conservative groups have come together under two separate coalitions, the United Front of Principlists and the Broad and Popular Coalition of Principlists. Some conservative groups remain outside either coalition. Similarly, several reformist groups, such as the Islamic Iran Participation Front (IIFP, also known as Mosharekat) and the Mojahideen of the Islamic Revolution (MIRO) came together as a reformist coalition in advance of the 2008 Majles elections. Another influential reformist group is the National Trust Party.
(US Department of State)
2)What is your country’s economic system?
GDP (purchasing power parity, 2008 est.): $859.7 billion.
GDP (official exchange rate, 2008 est.): $222.4 billion.
GDP real growth rate (2008 est.): 6.4%.
GDP composition by sector (2008 est.): Agriculture 10.8%, industry 44.3%, services 44.9%.
Per capita income (PPP, 2007 est.): $12,300.
Work force (2008 est.): 24.35 million.
Work force - by occupation (June 2007): Agriculture 25%, industry 31%, services 45%.
Unemployment rate (according to the Iranian Government): 12.5%.
Unemployment, a major problem even before the revolution, has continued to plague Iran. However, unemployment statistics only tell part of the story--underemployment continues to affect a large portion of Iran’s young, educated workforce. Although Iran’s poorer, rural population initially enjoyed a psychological boost from the attention given them by the new Islamic government, they are only marginally better off in economic terms. The government has made some progress on rural development, including electrification, road building, and increased access to education, but Iran still suffers from inefficiencies related to agricultural land usage that are politically difficult to reconcile. The agriculture sector still suffers from shortages of capital, raw materials, and equipment- problems that date back to the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war.
Although Islam guarantees the right to private ownership, banks and some industries--including the petroleum, transportation, utilities, and mining sectors--were nationalized after the revolution. Under President Rafsanjani, Iran first began to pursue some privatization through its nascent equities markets. However, the industrial sector, plagued by low labor productivity and shortages of raw materials and spare parts, remains uncompetitive against foreign imports.
Today, Iran's economy is struggling as a result of a bloated and inefficient state sector and an overdependence on the oil sector (which provides over 85% of government revenues). Although the Supreme Leader issued a decree in July 2006 to privatize 80% of the shares of most government-owned companies, private sector activity is typically limited to small-scale workshops, farming, and the service industry. As a result of inefficiencies in the economy, significant informal market activity flourishes and shortages of goods are common. President Ahmadi-Nejad has failed to make any notable progress in fulfilling the goals of the nation's latest 5-year plan. A combination of price controls and subsidies continues to weigh down the economy, while administrative controls and widespread corruption undermine the potential for private-sector-led growth. President Ahmadi-Nejad has made known his plan to eliminate Iran’s inefficient subsidies on food and petroleum imports; however, whether this plan will be actually implemented is unclear. Previous government-led efforts at economic reform--such as fuel rationing in July 2007 and the imposition of the value added tax (VAT) in October 2008--were met with stiff resistance and violent protests.
High oil prices in recent years allowed Iran to greatly increase its export earnings and amass over $70 billion in foreign exchange reserves. However, with oil prices currently below $40 per barrel, the Iranian Government is facing a particularly worrisome economic situation. The government has heavily withdrawn from the country’s Oil Stabilization Fund and there have even been reports that President Ahmadi-Nejad’s administration has illegally dipped into the foreign exchange reserves. Inflation is approaching 30%, while the unemployment rate continues to be in the double digits. Widespread underemployment amongst Iran’s educated youths has convinced many to seek employment overseas. While Iran’s economic quandary may look grim, the Islamic Republic has fared worse--notably during the Iran-Iraq war. With the government’s 2009 budget formulated to anticipate lower oil prices, it is very possible that Iran will be able weather adverse economic circumstances once again.
3) What are your most important cultural values?
Ethnic groups:
Persian 51%, Azeri 24%, Gilaki and Mazandarani 8%, Kurd 7%, Arab 3%, Lur 2%, Baloch 2%, Turkmen 2%, other 1%
Languages:
Persian and Persian dialects 58%, Turkic and Turkic dialects 26%, Kurdish 9%, Luri 2%, Balochi 1%, Arabic 1%, Turkish 1%, other 2%
Iranians have a very strong sense of class structure. In the past they referred to their society as being divided into tiers, or tabagheh, which were identified by numbers: the first tier corresponded to the upper classes; the second, to the middle classes; and the third, to the lower classes. Under the influence of revolutionary ideology, society is now perceived as being divided into the wealthy, a term generally prefixed with negative adjectives; the middle classes; and the mostazafin, a term that literally means disinherited. In reality, Iranian society has always been more complex than a three-tier division implies because each of the three broad classes is subdivided into several social groups. These divisions have existed in both urban and rural areas.
The overwhelming majority of Iranians--at least 90 percent of the total population--are Muslims who adhere to Shia Islam. In contrast, the majority of Muslims throughout the world follow Sunni Islam. Of the several Shia sects, the Twelve Imam or Twelver (ithna- ashari), is dominant in Iran; most Shias in Bahrain, Iraq, and Lebanon also follow this sect. All the Shia sects originated among early Muslim dissenters in the first three centuries following the death of the Prophet Muhammad in A.D. 632.
The principal belief of Twelvers, but not of other Shias, is that the spiritual and temporal leadership of the Muslim community passed from Muhammad to Ali and then sequentially to eleven of Ali's direct male descendants, a tenet rejected by Sunnis. Over the centuries various other theological differences have developed between Twelver Shias and Sunnis.
Prior to the Revolution of 1979, the political elite of the towns consisted of the shah and his family and court in Tehran and the representatives of the monarchy in the provincial towns. These representatives included provincial governors and city mayors, all of whom were appointed by Tehran; high-level government officials; high- ranking military officers; the wealthiest industrialists and financiers; the most prominent merchants; and the best known professionals in law, medicine, and education. The highest ranks of the Shia clergy--the clerics who had obtained the status of ayatollah--were no longer considered part of the national elite by the mid-1970s, although this social group had been very important in the elite from the seventeenth to the mid- twentieth century.
The Revolution of 1979 swept aside this old elite. Although the old political elite was not physically removed, albeit many of its members voluntarily or involuntarily went into exile, it was stripped of its political power. The new elite consisted first and foremost of the higher ranks of the Shia clergy. The most important administrative, military, and security positions were filled by lay politicians who supported the rule of the clergy. The majority of the lay political elite had their origins in the prerevolutionary middle class, especially the bazaar families
Prior to the Revolution of 1979, political connections were considered a key measure of one's social status. In other words, the amount of access that one was perceived to have to the highest levels of decision making was the major determinant of prestige. Wealth was important, but acquiring and maintaining wealth tended to be closely intertwined with access to political power. Consequently, members of the political elite were generally involved in numerous complex interrelationships. For example, some members of the Senate (the upper house of the parliament, or Majlis--see Glossary), a legislative body that included many members of the political elite appointed by the shah, were also on the boards of several industrial and commercial enterprises and were owners of extensive agricultural lands. Since being part of an elite family was an important prerequisite for entry into the political elite, marital relationships tended to bind together important elite families.
The other classes attempted to emulate the political elite in seeking connections to those with political power, whether on the provincial, town, or village level. By the 1970s, however, the nonelite of all classes perceived education as important for improving social status. Education was seen as providing entry into high-status jobs that in turn would open up opportunities for making connections with those who had political power. Despite a great expansion in educational opportunities, the demand far outstripped the ability or willingness of the elite to provide education; this in turn became a source of resentment. By the late 1970s, the nonelite groups, especially the middle classes, rather than admiring the elite and desiring to emulate them, tended to resent the elite for blocking opportunities to compete on an equal basis.
As a result of the lack of field research in Iran after the Revolution, it was difficult in the late 1980s to determine whether the traditional bases for ascribing class status had changed. It is probable that access to political power continued to be important for ascribing status even though the composition of the political elite had changed. It also appears that education continued to be an important basis for determining status.
Theocracy
Type: Islamic republic.
Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution--Ayatollah Ali Hosseini-Khamenei
President--Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad
First Vice President--Mohammad Reza Rahimi
Foreign Minister--Manouchehr Mottaki
Ambassador to the United Nations--Mohammad Khazaee
Constitution: Ratified in December 1979, revised 1989.
Branches: Executive--Supreme Leader (head of state), President (head of government), Council of Ministers, Assembly of Experts, Expediency Council, Council of Guardians. Legislative--290-member Majles (National Assembly, or Islamic Consultative Assembly). Judicial--Supreme Judiciary.
Political parties: Several conservative groups have come together under two separate coalitions, the United Front of Principlists and the Broad and Popular Coalition of Principlists. Some conservative groups remain outside either coalition. Similarly, several reformist groups, such as the Islamic Iran Participation Front (IIFP, also known as Mosharekat) and the Mojahideen of the Islamic Revolution (MIRO) came together as a reformist coalition in advance of the 2008 Majles elections. Another influential reformist group is the National Trust Party.
(US Department of State)
2)What is your country’s economic system?
GDP (purchasing power parity, 2008 est.): $859.7 billion.
GDP (official exchange rate, 2008 est.): $222.4 billion.
GDP real growth rate (2008 est.): 6.4%.
GDP composition by sector (2008 est.): Agriculture 10.8%, industry 44.3%, services 44.9%.
Per capita income (PPP, 2007 est.): $12,300.
Work force (2008 est.): 24.35 million.
Work force - by occupation (June 2007): Agriculture 25%, industry 31%, services 45%.
Unemployment rate (according to the Iranian Government): 12.5%.
Unemployment, a major problem even before the revolution, has continued to plague Iran. However, unemployment statistics only tell part of the story--underemployment continues to affect a large portion of Iran’s young, educated workforce. Although Iran’s poorer, rural population initially enjoyed a psychological boost from the attention given them by the new Islamic government, they are only marginally better off in economic terms. The government has made some progress on rural development, including electrification, road building, and increased access to education, but Iran still suffers from inefficiencies related to agricultural land usage that are politically difficult to reconcile. The agriculture sector still suffers from shortages of capital, raw materials, and equipment- problems that date back to the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war.
Although Islam guarantees the right to private ownership, banks and some industries--including the petroleum, transportation, utilities, and mining sectors--were nationalized after the revolution. Under President Rafsanjani, Iran first began to pursue some privatization through its nascent equities markets. However, the industrial sector, plagued by low labor productivity and shortages of raw materials and spare parts, remains uncompetitive against foreign imports.
Today, Iran's economy is struggling as a result of a bloated and inefficient state sector and an overdependence on the oil sector (which provides over 85% of government revenues). Although the Supreme Leader issued a decree in July 2006 to privatize 80% of the shares of most government-owned companies, private sector activity is typically limited to small-scale workshops, farming, and the service industry. As a result of inefficiencies in the economy, significant informal market activity flourishes and shortages of goods are common. President Ahmadi-Nejad has failed to make any notable progress in fulfilling the goals of the nation's latest 5-year plan. A combination of price controls and subsidies continues to weigh down the economy, while administrative controls and widespread corruption undermine the potential for private-sector-led growth. President Ahmadi-Nejad has made known his plan to eliminate Iran’s inefficient subsidies on food and petroleum imports; however, whether this plan will be actually implemented is unclear. Previous government-led efforts at economic reform--such as fuel rationing in July 2007 and the imposition of the value added tax (VAT) in October 2008--were met with stiff resistance and violent protests.
High oil prices in recent years allowed Iran to greatly increase its export earnings and amass over $70 billion in foreign exchange reserves. However, with oil prices currently below $40 per barrel, the Iranian Government is facing a particularly worrisome economic situation. The government has heavily withdrawn from the country’s Oil Stabilization Fund and there have even been reports that President Ahmadi-Nejad’s administration has illegally dipped into the foreign exchange reserves. Inflation is approaching 30%, while the unemployment rate continues to be in the double digits. Widespread underemployment amongst Iran’s educated youths has convinced many to seek employment overseas. While Iran’s economic quandary may look grim, the Islamic Republic has fared worse--notably during the Iran-Iraq war. With the government’s 2009 budget formulated to anticipate lower oil prices, it is very possible that Iran will be able weather adverse economic circumstances once again.
3) What are your most important cultural values?
Ethnic groups:
Persian 51%, Azeri 24%, Gilaki and Mazandarani 8%, Kurd 7%, Arab 3%, Lur 2%, Baloch 2%, Turkmen 2%, other 1%
Languages:
Persian and Persian dialects 58%, Turkic and Turkic dialects 26%, Kurdish 9%, Luri 2%, Balochi 1%, Arabic 1%, Turkish 1%, other 2%
Iranians have a very strong sense of class structure. In the past they referred to their society as being divided into tiers, or tabagheh, which were identified by numbers: the first tier corresponded to the upper classes; the second, to the middle classes; and the third, to the lower classes. Under the influence of revolutionary ideology, society is now perceived as being divided into the wealthy, a term generally prefixed with negative adjectives; the middle classes; and the mostazafin, a term that literally means disinherited. In reality, Iranian society has always been more complex than a three-tier division implies because each of the three broad classes is subdivided into several social groups. These divisions have existed in both urban and rural areas.
The overwhelming majority of Iranians--at least 90 percent of the total population--are Muslims who adhere to Shia Islam. In contrast, the majority of Muslims throughout the world follow Sunni Islam. Of the several Shia sects, the Twelve Imam or Twelver (ithna- ashari), is dominant in Iran; most Shias in Bahrain, Iraq, and Lebanon also follow this sect. All the Shia sects originated among early Muslim dissenters in the first three centuries following the death of the Prophet Muhammad in A.D. 632.
The principal belief of Twelvers, but not of other Shias, is that the spiritual and temporal leadership of the Muslim community passed from Muhammad to Ali and then sequentially to eleven of Ali's direct male descendants, a tenet rejected by Sunnis. Over the centuries various other theological differences have developed between Twelver Shias and Sunnis.
Prior to the Revolution of 1979, the political elite of the towns consisted of the shah and his family and court in Tehran and the representatives of the monarchy in the provincial towns. These representatives included provincial governors and city mayors, all of whom were appointed by Tehran; high-level government officials; high- ranking military officers; the wealthiest industrialists and financiers; the most prominent merchants; and the best known professionals in law, medicine, and education. The highest ranks of the Shia clergy--the clerics who had obtained the status of ayatollah--were no longer considered part of the national elite by the mid-1970s, although this social group had been very important in the elite from the seventeenth to the mid- twentieth century.
The Revolution of 1979 swept aside this old elite. Although the old political elite was not physically removed, albeit many of its members voluntarily or involuntarily went into exile, it was stripped of its political power. The new elite consisted first and foremost of the higher ranks of the Shia clergy. The most important administrative, military, and security positions were filled by lay politicians who supported the rule of the clergy. The majority of the lay political elite had their origins in the prerevolutionary middle class, especially the bazaar families
Prior to the Revolution of 1979, political connections were considered a key measure of one's social status. In other words, the amount of access that one was perceived to have to the highest levels of decision making was the major determinant of prestige. Wealth was important, but acquiring and maintaining wealth tended to be closely intertwined with access to political power. Consequently, members of the political elite were generally involved in numerous complex interrelationships. For example, some members of the Senate (the upper house of the parliament, or Majlis--see Glossary), a legislative body that included many members of the political elite appointed by the shah, were also on the boards of several industrial and commercial enterprises and were owners of extensive agricultural lands. Since being part of an elite family was an important prerequisite for entry into the political elite, marital relationships tended to bind together important elite families.
The other classes attempted to emulate the political elite in seeking connections to those with political power, whether on the provincial, town, or village level. By the 1970s, however, the nonelite of all classes perceived education as important for improving social status. Education was seen as providing entry into high-status jobs that in turn would open up opportunities for making connections with those who had political power. Despite a great expansion in educational opportunities, the demand far outstripped the ability or willingness of the elite to provide education; this in turn became a source of resentment. By the late 1970s, the nonelite groups, especially the middle classes, rather than admiring the elite and desiring to emulate them, tended to resent the elite for blocking opportunities to compete on an equal basis.
As a result of the lack of field research in Iran after the Revolution, it was difficult in the late 1980s to determine whether the traditional bases for ascribing class status had changed. It is probable that access to political power continued to be important for ascribing status even though the composition of the political elite had changed. It also appears that education continued to be an important basis for determining status.
4) What is your countries major religion? Minor religions?
Religions:
Muslim 98% (Shia 89%, Sunni 9%), other (includes Zoroastrian, Jewish, Christian, and Baha'i) 2%
5) What are your countries most important resources?
Trade (2008 est.): Exports--$106.4 billion (f.o.b.): petroleum 80%, chemical and petrochemical products, carpets, fruits, nuts.
Natural resources: Petroleum, natural gas, coal, chromium, copper, iron ore, lead manganese, zinc, sulfur.
Agriculture: Principal products--wheat, rice, other grains, sugar beets, fruits, nuts, cotton, dairy products, wool, caviar.
Industry: Types--petroleum, petrochemicals, textiles, cement and building materials, food processing (particularly sugar refining and vegetable oil production), metal fabricating (particularly steel and copper), armaments.
6) What important resources is your country lacking?
Iran isn't lacking many sources due to their oil, which makes them an oil rich country. they get everything they need from foreign countries even if their relationship with them may be hesitant.
7) Who are your five largest trading partners?
Major export partners (2007)--U.A.E. (17.1%), Germany (13.6%), Italy (6.7%), Turkey (5.3%), India (4.8%), Azerbaijan (4%), Turkmenistan (2.4%), China (3%), Singapore (2.5%). Imports--$67.79 billion (f.o.b.): industrial raw materials and intermediate goods, capital goods, foodstuffs and other consumer goods, technical services, military supplies. Major import partners--Germany (12%), China (10.5%), U.A.E. (9.4%), France (5.6%), Italy (5.4%), South Korea (5.4%), Russia (4.5%).
8) What is the size of your foreign and domestic debt? To whom do you owe money?
Economy Statistics & Total debt service TDS, current US$ (most recent) by country
# 33
Iran:
2,517,901,000 $
2005
Economy Statistics & Debt; External (per $ GDP) (most recent) by country
# 174
Iran:
$61.60 per 1,000 $ of GDP
2006
9) How big and technologically advanced is your military?
PERSONNEL
Total Population: 65,875,224 [2008]
Population Available: 39,851,026 [2008]
Fit for Military Service: 34,344,352 [2008]
Reaching Military Age Annually: 1,494,322 [2008]
Active Military Personnel: 545,000 [2008]
Active Military Reserve: 350,000 [2008]
Active Paramilitary Units: 11,390,000 [2008]
ARMY
Total Land-Based Weapons: 5,449Tanks: 1,613 [2006]
Armored Personnel Carriers: 640 [2006]
Towed Artillery: 2,010 [2006]
Self-Propelled Guns: 310 [2006]
Multiple Rocket Launch Systems: 876 [2006]
Mortars: 5,000 [2006]
Anti-Tank Guided Weapons: 75 [2006]
Anti-Aircraft Weapons: 1,700 [2006]
NAVY
Total Navy Ships: 65Merchant Marine Strength: 92 [2008]
Major Ports and Harbors: 3Aircraft Carriers: 0 [2008]
Destroyers: 0 [2008]
Submarines: 3 [2006]
Frigates: 3 [2006]
Patrol & Coastal Craft: 140 [2006]
Mine Warfare Craft: 5 [2006]
Amphibious Craft: 13 [2006]
AIR FORCE
Total Aircraft: 84 [2006]
Helicopters: 84 [2006]
Serviceable Airports: 331 [2007]
FINANCES (USD)
Defense Budget: $6,300,000,000 [2007]
Foreign Exch. & Gold: $69,200,000,000 [2007]
Purchasing Power: $762,900,000,000 [2007]
OIL
Oil Production: 3,956,000 bbl/day [2007]
Oil Consumption: 1,630,000 bbl/day [2006]
Proven Oil Reserves: 136,200,000,000 bbl [2007]
LOGISTICAL
Labor Force: 28,700,000 [2006]
Roadways: 179,388 kmRailways: 8,367 km
GEOGRAPHIC
Waterways: 850 kmCoastline: 3,180 kmSquare Land Area: 1,648,000 km
Sources: US Library of Congress; Central Intelligence Agency
Last Updated: 2/12/2009
Iran has two military forces. The national military is charged with defending Iran's borders, while the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is charged with protecting the revolution and its achievements. The Qods Force, a fifth branch of the IRGC, is the regime’s primary mechanism for cultivating and supporting terrorists abroad. The Qods Force provides aid in the form of weapons, training, and funding to Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist groups, Lebanese Hizballah, Iraq-based militants, and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan.
Iran spends about 3.3% of its GDP on its military. Iran's armed forces consist of both a national military, which was held over from the Shah's government, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, each with its own ground, naval, and air braches. The Iran-Iraq war took a heavy toll on Iran’s military, which was once the strongest in the region during the Shah’s reign. Iran has since worked to modernize its military, both conventionally and through the development of its ballistic missile and nuclear programs.
(US Department of State)
10) Are you a nuclear (military) power? Is a neighboring country a nuclear power?
Since September 2002, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been working to clarify the true nature of Iran’s nuclear program. The November 2004 Director General’s report indicated that Iran failed to report, declare, and provide design (or updated design) information on many issues. This includes:
Six failures to report the import of nuclear material, activities to process/use this material, testing of centrifuges, laser enrichment activities, production of specific nuclear materials, and the irradiation of nuclear materials and subsequent separation of plutonium.
Two failures to declare nuclear facilities, including a pilot centrifuge enrichment facility at Kalaye Electric Company, the laser enrichment plant at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center, and a pilot uranium laser enrichment plant at Lashkar Ab’ad.
Six failures to provide design information or updated design information for facilities in which nuclear material processing and storage took place.
The report also indicated a frequent failure to cooperate to facilitate the implementation of safeguards as evidenced by the extensive concealment activities.
Under international pressure, on November 10, 2003 Iran agreed to suspend all uranium-enrichment and reprocessing activities voluntarily, as well as cooperate fully with the IAEA. Iran then signed the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement on December 18, 2003, and agreed to implement it voluntarily pending ratification, granting IAEA inspectors greater access in verifying the correctness and completeness of Iran’s revised declaration to the IAEA on its nuclear program. Iran terminated its first suspension following inconclusive negotiations with the EU-3 and disagreements as to the scope of the required suspension, leading to additional negotiations and a second suspension that began in November 2004. This second suspension ended with Iran’s restart of its uranium conversion activities at its facility in Esfahan in August 2005. The IAEA Board found Iran in noncompliance with its Safeguards Agreement in September 2005 and, after Iran restarted uranium enrichment activities at Natanz in January 2006, reported Iran to the UN Security Council for its noncompliance. In February 2006, Iran ended its voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol.
11) Do you use nuclear energy? To what extent? For what purpose?
American officials and international inspectors are concerned that Iran seems to have made significant progress in the three technologies necessary to field an effective nuclear weapon: enriching uranium to weapons grade; developing a missile capable of reaching Israel and parts of Western Europe; and designing a warhead that will fit on the missile. And in late September 2009, Iran said that its Revolutionary Guards test-fired missiles with sufficient range to strike Israel, parts of Europe and American bases in the Persian Gulf. On Sept. 25, 2009, President Obama and leaders of Britain and France accused Iran of building a secret underground plant to manufacture nuclear fuel, saying the country has hidden the covert operation from international weapons inspectors for years.
In talks with the United States and other major powers on Oct.1, the first such discussions in which the United States has participated fully, Iran agreed to open the newly revealed plant to international inspection within two weeks. It also agreed to send most of its openly declared enriched uranium outside Iran to be turned into fuel for a small reactor that produces medical isotopes. The West accepted the idea because it would have delayed, by about a year, Iran's ability to make a bomb.
n 2003, under President Mohammad Khatami, a moderate, Iran admitted that it had been clandestinely pursuing an atomic program and agreed to suspend it. In 2006, under President Ahmadinejad, the country restarted a nuclear research program that it insisted was purely for peaceful purposes.
Iran defied a series of Security Council resolutions calling for a halt, and rebuffed diplomatic overtures from Europe and the United States. In May 2007 international inspectors reported that the country's scientists had mastered the process of enrichment, in which uranium is concentrated to the levels needed for power generation or, eventually, for an atomic bomb.
Late that year, American intelligence agencies issued a new National Intelligence Estimate that concluded that the weapons portion of the Iranian nuclear program remained on hold. Contradicting the assessment made in 2005, the report stated that the Iranian government did not appear determined to obtain nuclear weapons, although it said Iran's intentions were unclear, and that the country probably could not produce a bomb until the middle of the next decade.
American officials and international inspectors are concerned that Iran seems to have made significant progress in the three technologies necessary to field an effective nuclear weapon: enriching uranium to weapons grade; developing a missile capable of reaching Israel and parts of Western Europe; and designing a warhead that will fit on the missile. And in late September 2009, Iran said that its Revolutionary Guards test-fired missiles with sufficient range to strike Israel, parts of Europe and American bases in the Persian Gulf.
President Obama broke with President George W. Bush's policy by offering to negotiate directly with Tehran, but he continued to call the program a threat to the region. And like Mr. Bush, he found it difficult to persuade Russia and China to consider imposing tough sanctions on Iran if the talks failed.
On Sept. 25, 2009, President Obama and leaders of Britain and France accused Iran of building a secret underground plant to manufacture nuclear fuel, saying the country has hidden the covert operation from international weapons inspectors for years.
In talks with the United States and other major powers on Oct.1, the first such discussions in which the United States has participated fully, Iran agreed to open the newly revealed plant to international inspection within two weeks. It also agreed to send most of its openly declared enriched uranium outside Iran to be turned into fuel for a small reactor that produces medical isotopes. The West accepted the idea because it would have delayed, by about a year, Iran's ability to make a bomb.
However, the agreement is now in doubt as a result of the political struggle among Iran's elite, which has upended previous assessments about Iran's decision-making process, silenced more pragmatic voices and made it nearly impossible for anyone to support nuclear cooperation without being accused of capitulating to the West.
This move toward a harder line has stymied President Obama's attempts to open a new channel of communication with the Iranian leadership. Having set a year-end deadline for Iran to cooperate, the United States and its Western allies seem likely to seek to impose tougher sanctions on Iran, a step that some analysts fear could enable the more radical forces to monopolize power, at least in the short term.
Mr. Ahmadinejad ordered his atomic scientists on Feb. 7, 2010, to begin enriching their stockpile of uranium in order to power a medical reactor. The move came a few days after Mr. Ahmadinejad appeared to revive hope that Iran might accept a Western deal to swap much of its uranium for medical-reactor fuel that cannot be weaponized, a deal the Iranians had rejected.
Days later, on the anniversary of the overthrow of the shah, he announced that Iran was a "nuclear state," capable of processing uranium to a level of 20 percent enrichment. It was unclear whether Mr. Ahmadinejad's comments represented gamesmanship or a step toward acknowledging suspicions that it is pursuing a weapons program. The thrust of his remarks, and the timing of his nationally broadcast speech, reflected the central role played by Iran's nuclear program in domestic politics as Tehran confronts its worst political crisis since 1979.
12) How do you monitor your nuclear facilities?
Iran signed the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement on December 18, 2003, and agreed to implement it voluntarily pending ratification, granting IAEA inspectors greater access in verifying the correctness and completeness of Iran’s revised declaration to the IAEA on its nuclear program.
13) have you signed or ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty? Why or why not?
No Iran has not ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty because it infringes on our rights to produce uranium.
A report detailed Iran’s past commitments to stop enriching uranium, its decision to go ahead and its refusal to comply with a series of United Nations Security Council resolutions demanding that it halt its work. It also detailed questions Iran has refused to answer about evidence that it may have worked on the difficult problems of developing a warhead small enough to fit on a missile.
“Since August 2008, Iran has declined to discuss the above issues with the agency or to provide any further information and access” to locations and scientists, the report said.
“Altogether,” it said, the accumulated evidence of weapons work and lack of explanatory cooperation “raises concerns about the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile.”
President-elect Barack Obama promised in his campaign to make “the goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons a central element in our nuclear policy.”
The growing debate over the Iranian nuclear program is an important backdrop to the European effort, French officials said. Iran has refused to stop uranium enrichment despite United Nations sanctions. It says its enrichment program is only for peaceful nuclear power; no Western government believes that, and intelligence agencies expect Iran to have enough enriched material for a nuclear weapon by the end of 2009. Some nuclear experts say they believe that Iran has enough enriched uranium for one bomb.
The European Union is also proposing “the opening of consultations on a treaty forbidding short- and medium-range surface-to-surface missiles,” which is highly unlikely because of their increasing use in conventional warfare.
Other proposals include the universal ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the dismantling of nuclear bomb test sites, and a universal inspection regime, and the Europeans urge further progress in talks between the United States and Russia on a follow-on treaty to the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or Start.
14) Does your government control media and culture?
Iran's leaders harness media power
By Sebastian Usher
BBC world media correspondent
The Iranian leadership reinforces its message through the media
The authorities in Iran are highly conscious of the power of the media.
They use a two-pronged approach. At home, they enforce controls on the media that stifle freedom of expression, although there are still outlets on TV, radio, in the press and on the internet that provide alternative points of view and are available to ordinary Iranians.
Abroad, Iran harnesses satellite TV and radio to get its views across in a variety of languages - Arabic in particular - in an effort to influence opinion in neighbouring countries and the wider world.
In Iran, there is no escape from the control that the state exerts over the media.
Broadcasting is run by the authorities. It reflects the views of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his allies in the conservative clerical establishment.
There are no private, independent broadcasters allowed to operate inside the country.
The internet has provided a big challenge for the Iranian authorities in its efforts to control information
The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting controls TV and radio. It is dominated by conservatives, and has often been criticised by Iranian reformists for its conservative bias.
It often ignored the activities and statements of the former president - and reformist leader - Mohammed Khatami. In recent elections, reformists criticised state TV and radio for blatantly favouring conservative candidates.
But state TV and radio are not the only broadcasters available in Iran. Satellite ownership may be illegal, but the law is only intermittently enforced.
The result is that Iranians can see and hear non-state controlled media from outside the country. Outside influences
A flood of Farsi satellite stations is broadcast from the Iranian diaspora, particularly in the US. Most of these stations are shoestring affairs - amateurish and ramshackle - but they do provide very different viewpoints from those on state media.
Some exist solely to attack the Iranian authorities and are run by exiles from the Iranian revolution. They have covered protests in Iran, showing images that Iranians would never see on state TV. Voices of dissent face strict state controls the Iranian authorities are reported to have tried to jam the signals of these stations at especially sensitive times. Other channels profess to be non-political and concentrate on entertainment.
Iranians can also listen to foreign broadcasters that run Persian language services.
They include the BBC, Voice of America, Radio France Internationale and Deutsche Welle. Recently, Iran was reported to have blocked the BBC Persian service on the internet, which receives millions of hits. Blogs
The internet has provided a big challenge for the Iranian authorities in their efforts to control information.
It is now the main forum for dissident voices in Iran. Millions of Iranians have access to the internet and there are thousands of Iranian blogs.
In response, the government has adopted one of the most sophisticated internet censorship systems in the world - comparable to that used in China.
Only a handful of newspapers remain that voice alternative views to the conservative establishment
Officially, internet filtering is to block what the Iranian government sees as pornographic or immoral material. In practice, it also clearly tries to block sites with political content.
One of the reasons why the internet has become such an important medium for opposition or reformist voices in Iran is due to the crackdown on the press that hardliners have carried out in the past few years.
Only a handful of newspapers remain that voice alternative views to the conservative establishment. All newspapers have to be licensed.
The press law bans articles that "violate Islamic principles" or "might damage the foundation of the Islamic Republic".
Most of the key reformist newspapers have been closed down under the law and a number of journalists and editors imprisoned.
To bypass press censorship, reformist and opposition journalists have increasingly moved onto the internet, opening news sites and blogs.
But thanks to Iran's internet filtering system, the most prominent of these have periodically been blocked, with reports that hundreds - possibly thousands - of sites have been blacklisted.
Despite the authorities' efforts, Iranians are able to receive information that challenges what state broadcasters say from a variety of sources - whether by satellite, radio, the press or online.
But all of these face constraints and come under sporadic attack from the hardline conservative establishment, which dismiss them in any case as part of a foreign conspiracy to bring the country down.
15) Which countries are your major allies? are the countries you border friendly?
Border Friendly or Not:
Iran does not accept the two-state solution for Israel and the Palestinians. Iranian leaders have argued that Israel's existence is illegitimate, because it came about as a result of the destruction of Palestine. Iran continues to hold a vehement anti-Israel stance and President Ahmadinejad has made several provocative statements including calling for Israel to be “wiped off the map”.
Iran's relations with Iraq have not fully recovered from the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). However, during the 2003 Iraq conflict, Iran declared itself neutral. Whilst criticising military action, Iran made a commitment to remain outside the conflict. Iran says that it wants to work towards a stable and cohesive Iraq and is working with the Iraqi authorities in a number of areas such as border control and power supply. Iran hosted a conference on 30 November 2004, to discuss security in Iraq, ways to help the Iraqis stage their general election on schedule, and counter- insurgency. Interior Ministers and security officials from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Syria, Turkey, Jordan and Egypt participated. Iran also participated in the Sharm el Sheikh Iraq Neighbours Meeting on 4 May 2007, which resulted in an agreement to establish three neighbours’ working groups on security, refugees and food supplies. On 2 March 2008 President Ahmadinejad visited Baghdad. The Iraqi President, Prime Minister and Defence Minister visited Tehran in 2006 and 2007.
However, we are gravely concerned that Iran is also providing explosives, detonators and training to the Shi'a militia who are engaged in operations against United Nations forces in Iraq. Any Iranian links to armed groups in Iraq outside the political process, either through supply of weapons, training or funding, are unacceptable. They undermine Iran's proclaimed long-term interest in a secure, stable and democratic Iraq.
Elsewhere in the region, Iran publicly expresses its support for stability in Afghanistan, having suffered from the Afghan civil war and then the Taliban. Iran has pledged $560m over five years to the reconstruction of Afghanistan. The two countries have developed good counter-narcotics co-operation. But evidence exists of arms supplies to the Taleban originating in Iran, which is a worrying development.
Allies:
Both Iran and Russia believe they have important national interests at stake in developments in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus, particularly regarding energy resources in the Caspian Sea. The U.S. has expressed concern about Russia’s sales of military equipment and technology to Iran and Russian assistance in building a nuclear facility at Bushehr.
16) Which countries are you most concerned about?
The Islamic Republic of Iran still has not recognized Israel’s right to exist and has hindered the Middle East peace process by arming militants, including Hamas, Hizballah, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Although the Islamic Republic of Iran has contributed to positive reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, Tehran has also pursued policies to undermine stability in both countries. Additionally the U.S. Government is concerned with the Islamic Republic of Iran’s recent crackdown on human rights and detainment of civil society actors. The U.S. continues to call on Iran to cooperate more fully in the investigation into the case of Robert Levinson, an American citizen, who went missing on Kish Island, Iran, between March 8 and 9, 2007.
and
The United States and the UN for restricting out uranium producing.
17) Three most Important Events in Iran History since 1945?
Iran
Ayatollah Khomeini: The Uprising of Khurdad 15, 1979
Born Ruhollah Hendi, the Ayatollah (the word signifies religious leader) took the name in 1930. He taught in the major Shi'ite theological school at Qom, but was exiled for his opposition to the government of the Shah. Living in Paris after 1978 he orchestrated the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran. He became the effective political and religious leader of the country until his death in 1989.
Those who are ignorant must be guided to a correct understanding. We must say to them: "You who imagine that something can be achieved in Iran by some means other than Islam, you who suppose that something other than Islam overthrew the Shah's regime, you who believe non-Islamic elements played a role--study the matter carefully. Look at the tombstones of those who gave their lives in the movement of Khurdad 15. If you can find a single tombstone belonging to one of the non-Islamic elements, it will mean they played a role. And if, among the tombstones of the Islamic elements, you can find a single tombstone belonging to someone from the upper echelons of society, it will mean that they too played a role. But you will not find a single tombstone belonging to either of those groups. All the tombstones belong to Muslims from the lower echelons of society: peasants, workers, tradesmen, committed religious scholars. Those who imagine that some force other than Islam could shatter the great barrier of tyranny are mistaken. As for those who oppose us because of their opposition to Islam, we must cure them by means of guidance, if it is at all possible; otherwise, we will destroy these agents of foreign powers with the same fist that destroyed the Shah's regime.
V.S. Naipaul: Among the Believers, The Atlantic Monthly, July 1981, Shia Islam in Revolutionary Iran.
Published in 1981, the book was based on a 7-month journey across the Asian continent. V.S. Naipaul explores the culture and the explosive situation in those countries where fundamentalism was growing August 79-February 81. Naipaul does not include Arab countries as he is interested in "converted peoples". His travels (and travails) start with Iran, on to Pakistan, Malaysia and end in Indonesia, with a short stop in Pakistan and Iran on the return to the UK. Ayatollah Sadegh Khalkhali is interviewed in the book.
Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988).
18) Are you in the UN?
No Iran is not in the UN because on March 30th, 2010, President Obama predicted on Tuesday that he would be able to persuade the United Nations to “move forcefully” against Iran with new sanctions within weeks, not months, as he turned up the pressure on Tehran to back off its nuclear program.
17) Three most Important Events in Iran History since 1945?
Iran
Ayatollah Khomeini: The Uprising of Khurdad 15, 1979
Born Ruhollah Hendi, the Ayatollah (the word signifies religious leader) took the name in 1930. He taught in the major Shi'ite theological school at Qom, but was exiled for his opposition to the government of the Shah. Living in Paris after 1978 he orchestrated the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran. He became the effective political and religious leader of the country until his death in 1989.
Those who are ignorant must be guided to a correct understanding. We must say to them: "You who imagine that something can be achieved in Iran by some means other than Islam, you who suppose that something other than Islam overthrew the Shah's regime, you who believe non-Islamic elements played a role--study the matter carefully. Look at the tombstones of those who gave their lives in the movement of Khurdad 15. If you can find a single tombstone belonging to one of the non-Islamic elements, it will mean they played a role. And if, among the tombstones of the Islamic elements, you can find a single tombstone belonging to someone from the upper echelons of society, it will mean that they too played a role. But you will not find a single tombstone belonging to either of those groups. All the tombstones belong to Muslims from the lower echelons of society: peasants, workers, tradesmen, committed religious scholars. Those who imagine that some force other than Islam could shatter the great barrier of tyranny are mistaken. As for those who oppose us because of their opposition to Islam, we must cure them by means of guidance, if it is at all possible; otherwise, we will destroy these agents of foreign powers with the same fist that destroyed the Shah's regime.
V.S. Naipaul: Among the Believers, The Atlantic Monthly, July 1981, Shia Islam in Revolutionary Iran.
Published in 1981, the book was based on a 7-month journey across the Asian continent. V.S. Naipaul explores the culture and the explosive situation in those countries where fundamentalism was growing August 79-February 81. Naipaul does not include Arab countries as he is interested in "converted peoples". His travels (and travails) start with Iran, on to Pakistan, Malaysia and end in Indonesia, with a short stop in Pakistan and Iran on the return to the UK. Ayatollah Sadegh Khalkhali is interviewed in the book.
Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988).
18) Are you in the UN?
No Iran is not in the UN because on March 30th, 2010, President Obama predicted on Tuesday that he would be able to persuade the United Nations to “move forcefully” against Iran with new sanctions within weeks, not months, as he turned up the pressure on Tehran to back off its nuclear program.
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